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NO. 53 DECEMBER 2019 Introduction 
PD and M5S: 
The Italian Alliance of Convenience 
The Power of the Status Quo in a Challenging Economic Context 
Emanuele Caggiano and Paweł Tokarski 
The attempt to provoke early elections in August 2019 by the leader of the League, 
Matteo Salvini, unexpectedly led to a pragmatic coalition of the Five-Star Movement 
(M5S) and the Democratic Party (PD) and the formation of a second government under 
Giuseppe Conte. This government operates in a fragile political equilibrium where a 
fear of early elections, which could pave the way for Matteo Salvini to power, is the 
main stabilising factor. The pragmatic political calculation of the PD and M5S sup-
ported by Matteo Renzi’s new party “Italia Viva” may be enough to maintain the coali-
tion for a certain time, but it will not generate any major growth incentives for Italy, 
which are crucial in maintaining the sustainability of public debt. 
 
Political instability in Italy has been long 
considered the main issue that adversely 
affects its entire economic system. Weak 
state institutions and short-term economic 
policies cannot provide proper answers to 
structural challenges. Since the first govern-
ment of the Italian Republic, formed in 
July 1946 under the leadership of Alcide 
De Gasperi until 2019, Italy has had 
67 governments in 73 years. The Giuseppe 
Conte’s last government only stood for 
14 months. The future of the current one 
does not look very promising either. It is 
dependent on an unusual alliance between 
two parties that used to be competitors at 
regional and national level. The emergence 
of Matteo Renzi’s new centrist party, Italia 
Viva, has further complicated cooperation 
between the coalition partners. Although 
public support for the party is low (around 
5%), without the support of Italia Viva the 
coalition of the PD and M5S does not have a 
majority in parliament. However, since 
Salvini’s Lega has gone into opposition, sev-
eral factors have reinforced the incentives 
for the PD and M5S to continue cooperating 
and avoid new elections. 
PD and M5S: 
Factors for Cooperation 
The most obvious motive for the coopera-
tion for both parties is the fear that the 
next parliamentary elections in Italy will 
lead to a victory of the right-wing coalition 
led by Matteo Salvini. The personal conflict 
between the current Prime Minister Giu-
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seppe Conte and Matteo Salvini also plays a 
significant role. It has grown since the Lega-
M5S coalition was created in June 2018 and 
peaked when Salvini suddenly left the 
government and the coalition in August 
2019. Both politicians are currently leading 
the confidence rankings and this political 
duel forms the main line of confrontation 
in Italian politics. 
Another significant factor that could con-
tribute to the stability of Conte’s second 
government are changes to the way parlia-
ment functions. On 8 October 2019 the 
Italian Parliament approved a reduction in 
the number of its members by one third 
(from 945 to 600). Fewer seats in parliament 
means the current deputies have less chance 
of being re-elected. This is primarily a prob-
lem for the parliamentarians of the Five-
Star Movement, which has suffered consid-
erable losses in the polls since joining the 
coalition with the Lega. Several members of 
the M5S, including its leader Di Maio, will 
be prevented from being re-elected by the 
movement’s rule that no member of parlia-
ment may be elected more than twice. If 
the M5S does not change this internal rule 
MPs of the movement, most of whom are 
members of parliament for the second time, 
will not be inclined to hold early elections. 
Due to the reduction in the number of 
parliamentarians, the government will have 
to amend electoral law. The discussion 
about the new electoral law will take time 
and no new elections will be called until 
there is a vote on the changes. Both M5S 
and Italia Viva have no incentive to support 
early elections. They would prefer to change 
the current mixed electoral system (partial-
ly based on majority voting) and to intro-
duce a full proportional vote that would 
allow the two parties to both play an im-
portant role in a future government coali-
tion. Besides, the M5S has an internal com-
petition between members who support 
Di Maio and those who are more supportive 
of Giuseppe Conte. The PD is the only party 
that is rather indifferent to early elections, 
as it is likely to retain a similar number of 
seats in any future parliament. However, 
both the PD and M5S plan to change their 
internal party structures in early 2020, 
which will also be a disincentive for elec-
tions to be held during that time. 
Another important reason for the cur-
rent coalition to continue is the election of 
a new president by the parliament in 2022. 
In times of political instability, the president 
has fundamental powers to maintain the 
constitutional equilibrium. He names the 
prime minister and appoints ministers on 
the advice of the prime minister. In 2018, 
President Mattarella refused the nomina-
tion of Paolo Savona (an economist support-
ing Italexit) as finance minister, preventing 
any negative reactions from investors, which 
might have threatened the fiscal stability of 
the country. To avoid a Lega-dominated 
parliament choosing a successor to Sergio 
Mattarella and dominating the country’s 
political system, the M5S and PD will at-
tempt to keep control of parliament until 
that time. 
Furthermore, continuing the cooperation 
will allow the coalition partners to extend 
the influence of their political parties on 
the economy. More than 70 managers of 
the largest public enterprises are about to 
end their terms of office and need to be re-
placed. This affects, for example, the largest 
energy firms (Enel, Eni, Terna), defence com-
pany Leonardo and Poste Italiane, which 
will have to replace its executive boards in 
early 2020. In addition, the PD and M5S 
will have an impact on the appointment of 
many leading positions in state institutions, 
such as the president of the National Author-
ity for Anticorruption (ANAC). 
The Economy: Between Fire-
fighting and Structural Problems 
From the outset, the new government of 
Giuseppe Conte has had to deal with urgent 
economic issues. The key issue and one of 
the main formal reasons for the alliance 
between the M5S and PD was 2020 budget 
legislation to avoid raising VAT from 22% 
to 26.5%, which could have badly affected 
consumers and further undermined con-
fidence in the Italian political class. To 
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manage that, the government had to find 
around 23 billion euros in the budget from 
extra taxes and cuts in public spending. 
New taxes include ecotaxes (plastic tax) and 
higher taxes on gambling. The government 
also announced a plan to recover between 
3 and 4 billion euros by fighting tax evasion, 
which was supported by, for example, elec-
tronic invoicing and creating incentives for 
online payments. At the same time, the 
government aims to increase fines for tax 
evaders, including the confiscation of goods 
or prison sentences. However, it is doubtful 
whether these measures will help close the 
gap in the budget, which will put public 
finances under further stress. Here, the 
prospects are grim as there are no signs of 
any substantial recovery for economic 
growth in Italy. In 2019 and 2020 GDP is 
expected to grow by only 0.1 percent and 
0.4 percent respectively. The fiscal effect 
provided by the 2019 budgetary policy was 
much smaller than expected. The citizen’s 
basic income (Reddito di Cittadinanza), in-
troduced in 2019, has reached fewer people 
and generated a weaker-than-expected 
demand stimulus. 
With public debt reaching a record level 
of 136% of GDP in 2019, this squeeze on 
public finances considerably reduces Italy’s 
scope for growth-oriented spending. For 
example, according to the Osservatorio CPI 
(an Italian public finance watchdog), in 
2020, only 100 million euros is going to be 
invested in Industry 4.0 to support the tech-
nological development of the economy’s 
most productive sector. Italy’s industrial 
sector is suffering from low innovation and 
lack of new technologies, which is largely 
due to the composition of the market. A 
large proportion of the industry is made up 
of small or medium enterprises that cannot 
afford to invest in innovations and struggle 
to adjust to new, more difficult conditions 
on the market created by trade conflicts 
and stricter environmental standards. These 
conditions are also challenging for the 
largest firms, for instance current and pre-
vious governments have had to deal with 
the increasingly difficult situation of the 
largest steel company in Europe, ILVA, 
located in the Southern Italian city of 
Taranto, employing around 8,000 people. 
One of the main problems in Italy is the 
decline in real wages over the last decade 
compared to the rest of Europe, which has 
contributed to weak domestic demand, 
hampering economic growth. The govern-
ment is at least trying to reverse it by lower-
ing labour taxation. Another similar pro-
posal agreed between the coalition partners, 
is the introduction of a minimum wage 
(from eight to nine euros per hour). How-
ever, due to the north-south pay gap, a 
minimum wage imposed at national level 
may be counterproductive in some regional 
labour markets. This issue will continue to 
play an important role in electoral debates 
in 2020. 
Another bone of contention is the new, 
more generous pension system that the 
Conte’s first government planned to intro-
duce. Known as the “Quota 100”, it would 
create an additional burden on public 
finances and will be postponed until 2021. 
The new pension system will be one of the 
most important battlegrounds inside the 
coalition. Italia Viva and the PD are against 
this expensive pension reform that is ex-
pected to cost around 20 billion euros over 
three years. Both parties would prefer to 
invest more in infrastructure, education, 
research and innovation. These policies will 
not only be more efficient in terms of pub-
lic debt but they can generate wealth and 
growth for new generations. However, M5S 
politicians are afraid that Salvini, who 
pushed the new pension system, will use 
this issue against the M5S in any electoral 
campaign. 
Challenging Year 2020 
Elections will be held in eight of the 20 Ital-
ian regions in 2020, starting with Emilia-
Romagna and Calabria in January. The 
decision taken by M5S not to ally with the 
PD in Emilia-Romagna will not only con-
tribute to a good result for the right-wing 
parties grouped in one coalition, but will 
also increase conflicts in the government 
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coalition. After a poor result in Umbria in 
October, another defeat in Emilia-Romagna 
would cause frustration among PD mem-
bers and lead to more scepticism about its 
cooperation with M5S, which will be a test 
for the coalition. However, the incentives 
for both parties to remain in government 
will remain strong. Early elections would 
most likely result in a right-wing populist 
coalition of the Lega, Fratelli d’Italia and 
Forza Italia taking power, with Matteo 
Salvini as prime minister. A newly created 
grassroots protest movement, “The Sar-
dines”, directed mostly against Salvini, has 
enjoyed considerable media coverage. How-
ever, its establishment as a political force 
could increase the fragmentation of the left 
side of the political scene. The increasingly 
plausible scenario of Salvini as prime min-
ister would lead to an increase in interest 
rates on Italian bonds, which are already 
priced at a similar level to Greek ones. 
Italy is the only Eurozone member which 
still has not meaningfully recovered from 
the euro crisis. This is visible on the labour 
market, in the poor state of public finances, 
in problems in the banking sector, in struc-
tural challenges and not least in the gap 
between the north and the south of the 
country. Trade conflicts and the impending 
Brexit do not provide a favourable back-
ground for Italian exports, which contrib-
ute significantly to economic growth. The 
main problem is that Italy needs a compre-
hensive, long-term reform package focused 
on increasing investment, productivity, 
innovation and restructuring of the work-
force training system. Such a package is 
unlikely to be created and implemented in 
the current political context of permanent 
electoral campaigns and the poor state of 
public finances. The political class in Italy 
is a long way from solving the long-term 
challenges of the country concerning the 
labour market, efficiency of public institu-
tions and budgetary spending, risks in the 
banking sector and infrastructural prob-
lems. Italy’s internal political debates are 
disproportionately focused on migration, 
mainly because of Salvini, who raises these 
issues via social media. His use of the issue 
of reform of the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM) as a pretext for anti-European 
rhetoric has stiffened M5S’s resolve on this 
question. This shows that with pre-election 
rhetoric in Italy intensifying, the political 
space for Eurozone governance reforms is 
coming to an end. 
The political blockades at the national 
level and the poor state of state finances 
will exacerbate demands from Rome for a 
more expansionary fiscal policy in Germany 
and more flexibility of Eurozone fiscal rules. 
Italy’s growing public debt will sooner or 
later trigger speculation about its sustaina-
bility. The new European Commissioner for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, Paolo Genti-
loni, will play a key role in the dialogue 
with the current and next Italian Govern-
ment on fiscal policy issues. For the new 
ECB President, Christine Lagarde, Italy 
could be the biggest challenge of her term 
of office. It is the only institution with suf-
ficient resources to stabilise Italy’s public 
debt in the event of rising spreads of govern-
ment bonds and the ability to operate at 
limited political cost. 
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